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The pervasiveness of corporate governance cannot be separated with the existence of audit 
committee. It is expected that audit committee would be able to mitigate the agency costs caused by the 
asymmetric of information, thus aligning the interests of management and shareholders.  However, there is 
no such a guarantee that the likelihood of management to act according to their interest would be completely 
eliminated. Hence, there is still a tendency for the management to expropriate the resources of the 
corporation and use the private information they possessed to manipulate earnings. This article indentifies 
several characteristics of audit committee in determining their effectiveness to perform monitoring role and 
what factors of the characteristics are related to earnings management practices. The extant literatures show 
that several characteristics effectively reduce the earnings management practices, while the others do not 
have significant evidence in alleviating these practices. 
 





Agency theory explains that there is 
asymmetric information between 
shareholders as the principal and manager as 
the agent.  Managers tend to act based on 
their self-interests since they have better 
knowledge about the corporation than 
shareholders do (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
This phenomenon leads to the existence of 
board of directors as part of monitoring 
costs, in order to align the interest of the 
shareholders and the manager‟s.  The board 
of directors has the responsibility to oversee 
and control the activities of the management.  
Besides, it is the mediator between the 
internal parties of the corporation with its 
external stakeholders.  To be more effective 
in performing its role, the board of directors 
is generally segregated into several sub-
committees that have different function.  
One of the sub-committee is the audit 
committee whose general responsibility is 
to, “... review the integrity of the company‟s 
financial reporting and oversee the 
independence of the external auditors” (ASX 
2003).  Indeed, the existence of audit 
committee as required in best practices of 
good corporate governance is expected to 
provide unbiased monitoring device to the 
corporation that can reduce the asymmetric 
of information between manager and 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen 1983; Pincus 
et al. 1989).  However, it will not be able to 
totally eliminate managers‟ incentives to 
expropriate corporation‟s resources.  Thus, it 
still opens the opportunity for the 
corporation to engage in earnings 
manipulation. This article identifies what 
characteristics of the audit committee that 
are expected to be important in determining 
its effectiveness to perform monitoring role, 
and what factors that have been proven to be 
related to earnings management practices. 
Audit  Committee Characteristics 
Regulation requires listed corporations to 
have an audit committee.  In Australia, since 
2003 every corporation that is part of the 
S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index should 
mandatorily have an audit committee in the 
first year of their listing (ASX 2003).  While 
in the United States, audit committee has 
become one of the recommended practices 
by the stock exchanges since December 
1999.  In fact, McMullen (1996, p. 100) 
states that corporation which has an audit 
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committee is likely to have more 
accountable financial reporting.  Therefore, 
these days the existence of audit committee 
has become more prevalent since the 
regulations require that every board of 
directors in every listed corporation should 
have this sub-committee. 
Drawing from the literature and the 
regulation, in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of its role an audit committee 
should fulfil several characteristics: first, it 
should be independent to be able to firmly 
carry their monitoring role; second, the 
member of the committee should possess 
relevant knowledge, particularly in 
accounting and financial management; third, 
the committee should have regular meetings; 
and fourth, the size of a committee should 
consist of at least three members.  Hence, 
failed to implement these requirements will 
potentially undermine the responsibility of 
the committee to oversee the accounting 
process and to ensure the credibility of 
financial reporting.  As a consequence, this 
will open the opportunity for management to 
involve in earnings management practices.   
It is perceived that audit committee 
characteristics, i.e. independent and 
knowledge, would be strongly correlated 
with the managers‟ propensity to involve in 
earning management practices.  On the other 
hand, it is suspected that other 
characteristics such as activity and size have 
less correlation with earnings management.  
The perceived correlation between audit 
committee characteristics and earnings 
management is depicted in figure 1.  Next 
section provides detailed discussion about 
the independence, knowledge, activity and 
size of the audit committee which are 
beneficial in determining its effective 
monitoring role.  Subsequently, every part 
will also discuss the relationship between 
the characteristics and earnings 
management. 
Independence.  The independence of 
audit committee members is essential so that 
they will unbiasedly exercise their judgment.  
This independence will contribute to a better 
performance in mitigating contracting costs 
(Deli & Gillan 2000).  ASX (2003) denotes 
that being independent means the members 
are not the executive directors of the 
corporation.  They also should not be the 
representation of the majority shareholders 
and should not possess any material 
relationship with the corporation.  
Additionally, they are required to support  
the function of external auditors and at the 
same time promote the accountability of 
internal management audit function, without 
conflicting the relationship between these 
two parties (Shailer 2004, p. 41).  Generally, 
Kang et al. (2007, p. 197) summarize that 
the board which comprises of majority 
independent members will be positively 
improved their responsibility to monitor and 
guaranteed a better performance of the 
corporations.   
An audit committee which is only 
comprised of solely independent members is 
more effective in performing its duty, even 
though there is inconclusive evidence that 
majority independent members will also be 
sufficient.  Several studies find that it is 
1. Independence 
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Figure 1. The Correlation between Audit Committee Characteristics and 
Earnings Management 
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important for the committee to have 
members who are completely independent 
so that it is able to exercise the monitoring 
role efficiently (Bedard et al. 2004; 
McMullen & Raghunandan 1996; Saleh et 
al. 2007).  These studies are supporting the 
recommendation of solely independent audit 
committee by the regulation (ASX 2003; 
BRC 1999, SOX 2002).  Indeed, 
corporations that are in a financial distressed 
situation would perform better when they 
have solely independent audit committee 
(Bronson et al. 2009, p. 266).  Moreover, the 
study of Abott et al. (2000, p. 61) shows that 
a corporation whose audit committee is only 
assembled of independent members as 
required by Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 
will unlikely be penalized by the Security 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).  On the 
other hand, other studies show that the 
effectiveness of audit committee monitoring 
role would be enhanced when majority of 
the members are independent (Klein 2002, 
p. 389; Rahman & Ali 2006, p. 787).  In 
fact, the study of Lee and Shailer (2008, p. 
130) shows that the confidence of individual 
and institutional investors is increased 
whenever audit committee consists of 
majority compares to solely of independent 
directors.  However, these studies are not 
conclusive, since they do not clearly 
mention the reason of why majority 
independent members will make an audit 
committee be better than having solely 
independent members.  Therefore, since the 
regulation require an audit committee to 
have solely independent members, it will be 
more preferable for every listed company to 
comply with the requirement.  
Audit committee independence is 
significantly related to earnings management 
practices.  The study of Saleh et al. (2007, p. 
156) proves that the tendency to manage the 
earnings are decreased when Malaysian 
corporations have completely independent 
audit committee members.  Their study is 
beneficial to improve the corporate 
governance practice in Malaysia, since 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
only requires that audit committee be 
consisted of majority non-executive 
directors.  Furthermore, Bedard et al (2004) 
test the significance for the corporation that 
has majority independent members compare 
to audit committee whose members are 
solely independent.  Their results show that 
the corporations whose audit committee 
consists of solely independent members 
demonstrate a considerable decline of the 
probability to aggressively manipulate their 
earnings (Bedard et al. 2004, p. 29).  In 
addition, Klein (2002, p. 398) also 
summarizes that independent characteristic 
of audit committee has an association with 
earnings management.  However, she finds 
that there is no significant relationship 
between audit committee that has 
completely independent members and the 
abnormal accruals which indicates 
management discretion to manipulate 
earnings.  In general, Peasnell et al. (2005, p. 
1339-1340) state that corporations with large 
number of independent directors have less 
tendency to upwardly manage their earnings 
but they could not find similar indication for 
income-decreasing earnings management.  
Further, Beasly‟s (1996, pp. 454-457) study 
shows that the corporations which are 
mostly engaged in financial reporting fraud 
are those that have less independent board 
and no audit committee.  On the contrary, 
Rahman and Ali (2006) in their study do not 
find sufficient evidence that there is a 
negative association between the 
composition of independent audit committee 
members and discretionary accruals among 
Malaysian corporations (Rahman & Ali 
2006, p. 798).  However, this study is only 
comprised of 97 corporations and conducted 
in a fairly short period of 2002 to 2003.  
These results should be analysed carefully, 
since there is an inconsistency with more 
recent study which is also using Malaysian 
corporations by Saleh et al. (2007).  This 
latter study is conducted with more sample 
size and found that there is a significant 
association between those two variables.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
independence of audit committee members 
is a significant factor in preventing the 
earnings management practices.  This is 
because the committee will be able to 
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unbiasedly monitor the financial reporting 
process in the company, besides to exercise 
their judgement without intervention from 
the management. 
The effective monitoring role of 
independent audit committee particularly in 
preventing earnings management practices 
will not be adequate if it is not supported by 
a proper compensation mechanism.  It is 
asserted that the members of an audit 
committee should not be remunerated by 
stock options since this type of 
compensation will deteriorate their 
independence and induce bias in their 
monitoring role (Bedard et al. 2004, p. 29).  
In fact, if they are able to exercise their 
options close to the vesting date, there is a 
tendency for the audit committee to tolerate 
earnings management practices in order to 
increase the stock price.  Thus, in order to 
maintain the independence of the committee, 
the compensation mechanism should not 
give incentives for the members to tolerate 
the company in managing its earnings. 
Knowledge.  Possessing the 
appropriate knowledge of accounting and 
finance is desirable for audit committee 
members, especially if they are part of 
accounting professional body.   The 
appropriate knowledge would enhance the 
responsibility of the audit committee 
members to effectively monitor and 
safeguard the financial reporting integrity.  
The regulations signify that at least one of 
the members of audit committee should be a 
financial expert (ASX 2003; BRC 1999; 
SOX 2002).  Besides, it would be preferable 
if the financial expert members are affiliated 
with accounting professional body or having 
experience as public accountant, auditor or 
financial officer (McMullen & Raghunandan 
1996, p. 80).  This will ensure that these 
members have enough understanding 
regarding accounting standards and financial 
management practices to be able to carry out 
their duties. 
Several studies show that the audit 
committee which has members with 
particular knowledge is more effective in 
performing its monitoring role.  McDaniel et 
al. (2002, p. 163) support that financial 
expertise of the audit committee members 
will help them to ensure the quality of 
financial reporting of the corporation. In 
fact, Bedard et al. (2004, pp. 27-29) assert 
that not only financial knowledge, but also 
governance knowledge and specific 
knowledge about the operations of the 
corporation will accentuate the effectiveness 
of audit committee role.  Moreover, 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996, pp. 79-
81) conduct a survey of 51 corporations with 
financial problems and 77 corporations 
without financial problems. They found that 
only 6% of the financial-problem 
corporations have CPA in their audit 
committee.  Quite the opposite, 25% of the 
non-financial problem corporations have 
financial expert who is a CPA in their audit 
committee.  In addition, McDaniel et al. 
(2002, p. 142) state, the existence of 
financial experts in the audit committee will 
improve the financial reporting quality.  This 
is because they have the appropriate 
knowledge that will make them dedicate 
most of their mind and time to examine and 
monitor the financial reporting activities.  
Furthermore, the existence of financial 
expertise among the members of audit 
committee brings positive reaction to the 
stock price of the corporation (Davidson et 
al. 2004, p. 287-289).  This suggests that 
market is highly appreciated the 
corporations whose directors are 
competence in overseeing the financial 
reporting activities.  Therefore, an audit 
committee which has financial and 
accounting expert members should be more 
effective in performing their monitoring role 
and increase the value of the company. 
There is some evidence that 
employing members with specific 
knowledge about financial reporting helps 
the committee to be more effective in 
preventing the likelihood for the corporation 
to engage in earnings management practices.  
Specifically, having the combination of 
active meeting and employing financial 
expertise in the audit committee lessen the 
likelihood of earnings manipulation in the 
corporation (Saleh et al. 2007, p. 156).  
Indeed, the corporation which has less 
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number of financial expert members in the 
committee tend to experience financial 
difficulties (Rahmat et al. 2009, p. 633).  
However, Bedard et al. (2004, p. 17) argue 
that the effectiveness of audit committee 
expertise will be reduced whenever the 
members possess more directorships outside 
the corporation.  In fact, Lee and Shailer 
(2008, p. 128-129) contend that these 
additional duties create trade-off between 
their competence and time commitment to 
the corporation.  This gives the implications 
that on the one hand the members of audit 
committee would be able to gain better 
experience and knowledge by having other 
directorships.  While on the other hand, they 
would be less devoted to perform better 
monitoring role especially to prevent 
earnings management practices.  Hence, 
having financial and accounting experts in 
the audit committee will expectedly 
contribute to the effective control over the 
financial reporting process in a company, so 
that any tendency for the managers to 
manipulate earnings would be inhibited. 
Activity.  The audit committee 
which is more active in conducting meetings 
will be more effective in its monitoring role.  
ASX (2003) states, in order for the audit 
committee to perform their role effectively, 
it should conduct frequent meeting.  In fact, 
BRC prescribes that the committee should 
meet at least four times a year and even 
more regular if needed (BRC 1999).  Several 
studies describe that by conducting more 
frequent meetings the audit committee 
would be able to be more effective in 
overseeing the corporation‟s financial 
reporting activities (Menon & Williams 
1994, p. 137; McMullen & Raghunandan 
1996, p. 81).  This means that any potential 
problem particularly regarding the financial 
reporting in the company would be 
recognized earlier.  
Some studies indicate that the 
activity of audit committee is related to the 
occurrence of earnings management 
practices.  Audit committee which conducts 
regular meetings according to the prescribed 
threshold is found to lessen the corporations‟ 
tendency in misstating their earnings 
(Abbott et al. 2000, p. 61).  In fact, as the 
frequency of the meeting increase, there is 
likelihood that corporations‟ discretionary 
accruals will decrease (Xie et al. 2003, p. 
310).  This indicates that the meetings 
provide the means for the committee to be 
better performed their monitoring role.  
However, Bedard et al. (2004, p. 30) find 
that meeting frequency of the committee has 
no significant association with the 
possibility of the corporations to conduct 
earnings management aggressively.  
Similarly, Lin et al. (2006, pp. 929-930) 
discover that when testing the relationship 
between audit committee activity and 
earnings restatement the result shows that 
there is no significantly negative relationship 
between those two variables.  Consistent 
with these studies, Saleh et al. (2007, p. 149) 
also find that the average frequency of four 
meetings per year does not lead to more 
effective monitoring of earnings 
management among Malaysian corporations.  
Nevertheless, they contend that the 
regularity of meeting could possibly indicate 
that the audit committee encounters more 
issues regarding the corporations‟ financial 
reporting (Saleh et al. 2007, p. 159).  Hence, 
to some extent the activity of audit 
committee is not a strong factor in 
determining the likelihood of a company to 
manage earnings.  There should be more 
than just conducting frequent meetings for 
an audit committee to be able to perform 
better, because the quality of the meetings is 
more important.  The committee should 
spend more time in analysing the company‟s 
financial reports and addressing critical 
issues that have a tendency to facilitate 
earnings management practices. 
Size. The effectiveness of audit 
committee‟s monitoring role is relatively 
determined by the size of the committee.  
ASX and BRC both explicitly advise that 
audit committee should at least consist of 
three members (ASX 2003; BRC 1999).  
This size is potentially associated with the 
members‟ expertise.  Saleh et al. (2007, p. 
150) state that audit committee should 
possibly benefit from having more members.  
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Since, it is more likely that more knowledge 
and expertise that are available inside the 
committee which provide adequate 
resources to perform its duty. 
Several studies show that the size of 
an audit committee is contributing to its 
possessing more ability to exercise the 
monitoring role.  Pearce and Zahra (1992, 
cited in Saleh et al. 2007, p. 150) affirm that 
whenever the audit committee composed of 
relatively large number of members, there 
would be possibility that they have more 
knowledge that is useful in performing their 
role.  More general, Dalton et al. (1999, pp. 
676-677) assert that the relation between 
size of the board and their monitoring role 
exhibit a positive correlation.  Thus, larger 
size of board will improve the monitoring 
mechanism and increase the performance of 
the corporation.  This association should 
also be applied to the characteristic of audit 
committee.  However it is argued that the 
audit committee which is too large or too 
small would adversely affect their 
effectiveness (Rahmat et al. 2009, p. 627).  
Excessively large size committee would 
create the incentives for each member to rely 
on to other members, hence lessen their 
participation in the committee, even though 
they might have more diverse skills and 
knowledge.  While the audit committee 
which is too small in size would potentially 
render less monitoring support to the 
corporations, since it might have less 
essential knowledge and skills to perform 
the duties.  In addition, Pincus et al. (1989, 
p. 261) contend that the relationship between 
the size of audit committee and performance 
of the corporation is insignificant.  Indeed, 
they find that audit committee size is not the 
main factor in determining the efficient 
composition of the committee.  Therefore, a 
reasonable size of the audit committee 
should also be supported by the proper skills 
and knowledge for the committee to enhance 
their role.  
There is only limited evidence which 
show that there is a relationship between the 
size of an audit committee and earnings 
management practices.  Specifically, Lin et 
al. (2006, pp. 929-930) find that concerning 
the effectiveness of their role, there is a 
negative association between the size of 
audit committee and earnings restatement 
which is the more observable form of 
earnings management.  This means that the 
larger the size of the audit committee, the 
less likely of a corporation to engage in 
earnings management.  However, when 
examined the performance difference of 
audit committee characteristics on financial 
and non-financial difficulties corporations, 
Rahmat et al. (2009, p. 631) find that the 
size of audit committee does not have 
impact on financial performance of the 
corporations.  Hence, there is not enough 
evidence to conclude that the size of the 





In conclusion, the existence of audit 
committee inside the corporation will help to 
align the interests of management and 
shareholders.  Several characteristics of 
audit committee such as; independence, 
knowledge, activity and size, show that it is 
capable to perform better and effective 
monitoring role, especially in safeguarding 
the quality of financial reporting.  In fact, it 
will be better performed when comprises of 
majority or solely of independent member, 
has enough financial expert members, 
performs frequent meetings and consists of 
reasonable number of members.  Moreover, 
Abbott et al. (2000, p. 57) state that audit 
committee members should possess two 
motivations that will lead to more effective 
monitoring mechanism.  Firstly, they should 
be able to maintain their reputational capital 
by performing qualified service to the 
committee.  Secondly, they should be aware 
of the imposed director‟s liability which will 
prevent them from being involved in 
unlawful activities. 
 Several characteristics of audit 
committee are strongly correlated with 
earnings management practices.  First, some 
studies show that the independence of audit 
committee reduces the likelihood of earnings 
management practices.  This is because they 
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would be able to perform well without 
influence from the management.  Second, 
having financial expertise in accounting and 
financial management also allow the 
members to be able to monitor and 
safeguard the quality of financial reporting 
of the corporation.  However, other 
characteristics such as frequency of meeting 
and size of the committee do not show 
strong correlation with the possibility of 
reducing the tendency to engage in earnings 
management practices.  Based on the 
literature, the assumption regarding the 
correlation between audit committee 
characteristics as summarized on figure 1 
has been proved.   
Finally, regardless how well the 
characteristics of audit committee, every 
corporation should not only be able to 
comply with the regulation but also ensure 
they are well-govern.  This will relatively 
guarantee that they would be able to act 
according to the best interest of the 
corporation and to be more aligned with the 
shareholders‟ interests.  Since the audit 
committee and its characteristics are 
specified in the regulation, it is important for 
every listed company to comply with the 
requirements.  This helps to demonstrate 
their willingness to be more transparent and 
accountable to the investors.  To a large 
extent, whenever every listed company is 
able to comply with the best practices in 
corporate governance, it is expected that the 
capital market will be more thrived and will 
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